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Assessing China's Soft Power in Asia: Implications for U.S. Strategy

by

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**ASSESSING CHINA'S SOFT POWER IN ASIA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The identification of the Twenty-First Century as the Pacific Century and the Rise of China signal a transformation in the international order that political leaders and strategists around the globe seek to understand. Most assessments of the strategic factors behind this transformation in Asia tend to focus on the more traditional quantifiable measures of power, such as military and economic power. The concept of soft power, as originated by Joseph Nye, posits an alternative, non-coercive form of power based on attraction rather than force or payment. This paper will review existing assessments and specific case studies of China's soft power in Australia, South Korea, Bangladesh, and Burma in order to evaluate the effectiveness of Chinese soft power and derive strategic recommendations for the U.S.

ASSESSING CHINA'S SOFT POWER IN ASIA; IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY

Part I: Introduction

America's strategic pivot to Asia is a matter of record now. The region has demonstrated its economic importance, vitality, and increasing integration, both internally and with the rest of the world. The potential for conflict on the Korean peninsula and concern over China's growing anti-access/area denial capabilities remain, but the real challenge is in the everyday competition for influence throughout the region. In this competition, positive influence or soft power based on attraction, persuasion, and the ability to frame an agenda becomes a critical asset to be employed in support of national objectives. This paper considers the question of "how capable is China projecting soft power regionally?"

Project Scope and Outline:

This paper assesses China's ability to wield soft power in the Asia-Pacific region.¹ U.S. capabilities for soft power will be the yardstick against which Chinese capabilities are measured. The purpose of this paper is not to devise academic theories, but instead to evaluate Chinese soft power using the concept of power developed by Joseph Nye.

The second section of the paper will examine Nye's soft power concept in relation to his greater conception of national power and strategy. Given the breadth and depth of the concept of soft power, this section will examine the model and consider

differing interpretations and common criticisms. Ultimately this section will identify why the concept of soft power is important to the strategist.

The third section assesses China's capabilities and use of soft power as an actor within the global system by reviewing existing literature and studies. These works address China's level of effort in projecting soft power, the strength and weaknesses in China's soft power resources, and China's skill in power conversion to achieve their desired outcomes. This section addresses China's relative soft power, especially when compared to that of the U.S.

The fourth section uses four country case studies to further examine China's application of soft power in the region. The four case studies are Australia, South Korea, Bangladesh, and Burma (Myanmar). These case studies examine China's relational power in two-party relationships. This section evaluates how Chinese soft power works in actual application, especially when applied in different contexts and while intermixed with hard power considerations.

The final section pulls together the perspectives on Chinese soft power from the two levels of assessment used in the previous sections: China as an actor in a global system and as one side of a two-party relationship. This conclusion will also consider implications for U.S. strategy, based both on China's level of soft power now and its possible path in the future. As a final note, the conclusion makes some final observations on how soft power and strategy relate.

Part II: Strategy and Soft Power

Traditionally, strategists describe strategy through the equation of “means plus ways to achieve ends.” Joseph Nye updates this terminology in his latest work, *The Future of Power*. Instead of means, ways, and ends, he speaks in terms of power resources and power behaviors utilized to achieve outcomes. Nye notes that resources alone do not convey power; a process of power conversion is necessary to convert resources into intelligent or smart behaviors. Just as possessing a large army does not always guarantee victory, a country with many strategic resources cannot guarantee positive strategic outcomes. Both armies and strategic resources can be squandered and lost through careless or unwise employment. The employment of resources for a specific behavior is necessary to achieve desired outcomes.²

Another key strategic insight that Nye discusses is the importance of context when exercising power. The international environment, cultural considerations, and popular perceptions all serve to provide unique opportunities and constraints to the exercise of power.³ For example, in some contexts, the expression of American popular culture may be attractive while in others it may incite people to anger and violence. Or as Nye observes, the Pope’s power depends on the context: his influence differs among Christians and non-Christians and even among Catholics and Protestants.⁴

Within the realm of strategy where context and skill in converting resources to actual power are critical, nations can wield power through military force or economic transaction which are forms of hard power. Nye, however, has also recognized and identified a third path to power: the respected or attractive part of power and influence

which he labels as soft power. Soft power, as defined by Joseph Nye, is “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”⁵

In defining soft power, Nye makes it clear that his definition is narrower than the entire concept of influence.⁶ Nye’s focus is the attractive or positive side of psychological influence, as opposed to a broader definition which would include influence achieved by transaction, threat, or coercion. Nye identifies a spectrum of power behaviors, with the soft behaviors such as framing, persuading, and attracting on the co-optive or soft side of the spectrum.⁷ On the opposite side of the spectrum, which Nye labels the command side, are the hard behaviors like coercion and transaction.⁸ In Nye’s concept, the definition of soft power clearly rests on the use of “soft behaviors” to achieve desired outcomes. With regard to soft power, understanding the “ways” is as important as simply identifying the “means.”

As part of the process of defining and explaining soft power, Nye also discusses the key means or “power resources” which underpin soft power. He identifies foreign policies, political values, and culture as the three key means that allow a country to undertake the soft power behaviors of framing, persuading, and attraction.⁹ Nye additionally recognizes that “many types of resources can contribute to soft power.”¹⁰ Therefore, while the identification of key resources is helpful to understanding soft power, it alone should not be mistaken for a complete picture of soft power.

As Nye narrows his definition of soft power to specific behaviors and identifies its key resources, he recognizes that soft power cannot be entirely segregated from hard

power resources of the economic and military type. Military and economic resources can serve in attractive, persuasive, or agenda-framing roles. Military exchanges and economic assistance are key examples of hard power resources utilized for soft power behaviors. His critical observation is that the manner in which military and economic resources are employed can either support or hinder soft power behaviors and outcomes.

Restated for the purpose of this paper, soft power is the employment of the resources of culture, values, and foreign policy, as well as some economic and military resources to achieve favorable strategic outcomes through co-optive or positive psychological influence on foreign audiences. When considering soft power, it should not be thought of not simply as resources, but also as a trinity of behaviors (or means), which include persuasion, attraction, and agenda setting. Furthermore, the possible outcomes achievable by soft power depend on the overall context of the two parties in the relationship and the interaction with hard power behaviors.

Differing Interpretations and Critiques of Nye's model of Soft Power

Early interpretations of soft power commonly fixated on culture, which is only one of its constituent resources.¹¹ Soft power, however, is more than just culture. As discussed earlier, it can be any resource which provides attractive and persuasive power. Furthermore, culture's contribution should be considered a relatively fixed variable, one that is not easily modified by national strategy. This paper considers all three of Nye's named soft power resources, and not just culture.

Soft power has also been conflated with the influence which comes from economic relationships between nations.¹² Nye, however, treats economic power as a form of hard power. Economic activity predominantly involves trade and investment. Transactions involving payments and exchanges are rational actions, on the “command” side of the power behavior spectrum. While this does not mean that economic power cannot support soft power, it does mean that economic trade and investment is not equal to persuasive or attractive influence. Economic power is a hard, not soft, power.

Some interpretations see culture, and soft power by extension, as being derived from economic strength. Two American scholars make this argument in their book, *The End of Influence*, in which they write:

Money brings a nation power, not just the power to command, or at least influence, the behavior of other nations. And when the money accumulates over time and as a result of real economic success, and not just windfalls from guano or oil deposits, it brings the power to propagate, consciously or not, the ideas, concerns, fashions, norms, interests, amusements, and ways of displaying and behaving that come out of its culture.¹³

While soft power has a relationship to hard power, the proposition that it is all derived from economics and money is not accepted by this paper. Economically powerful nations such as Japan do not seem to have gained inordinate soft power through a high GDP. Other examples, discussed in the case studies later, provide further evidence that money alone does not equal soft power.

Another common limited interpretation of soft power is equating it with a single means to project soft power, usually a communications process such as public affairs or strategic communication. Soft power is more than just communication or marketing; it includes the soft power resources which underpin the narrative as well as other

activities like education and engagement which build lasting relationships.¹⁴ Rather than being simply considered as a means to advertise strategy, soft power should be conceptualized as a source of power that is an integral part of strategy.

Some scholars, such as David Lampton, have expanded the concept of soft power by including human capital and refashioning it as “ideational power.”¹⁵ By including human capital with Nye’s soft power resources, Lampton’s approach leads to a more resource-based approach to soft power. As noted previously, this project will attempt to stick closely to Nye’s explicit description of soft power with its designated range of resources and focus on behaviors.

Nye’s model has been critiqued by international relations scholars such as Christopher Layne.¹⁶ Layne’s critiques include the loose nature of soft power’s definition, the claim that the concept is nothing more than refashioned liberal international relations theory, and the irrelevance of public opinion on foreign policy elites, even in democratic nations. In response, Nye has continued to refine his vision of soft power to focus it on soft power behaviors, and not just its resources.¹⁷ He and others, however, have identified the roots of soft power in traditional realism.¹⁸ Lastly, as the Arab Spring and other popular movements around the world indicate, public attitudes can have significant effect, through political process or popular demonstrations in both democratic and authoritarian regimes.

Other critics, such as the strategist Colin Gray, argue “...there are serious limitations to the worth of the concept of soft power, especially as it might be thought of as an instrument of policy.”¹⁹ Gray’s critiques deride the strategic usefulness of soft

power based on the length of time necessary to employ soft power, the difficulty in influencing and understanding foreign attitudes and motivations, and the contention that soft power flows from hard power, but not the reverse. Gray critiques soft power as if it is mutually exclusive of hard power; that is, if you use one you cannot use the other.

Soft Power and its relevance for Strategy and the Strategist

Soft power is not meant as a substitute or replacement for hard power. Nye recognizes that military power is still useful and economic power has increased in significance.²⁰ Nye's concept of smart power recognizes the substantial synergy that can be gained by the coordinated employment of soft and hard power. For the strategist, Nye's soft power model increases our understanding of the dynamics behind the art of strategy.

Conceiving of and understanding soft power is useful for three main reasons. First, soft power is an analytical tool that allows the strategist to incorporate a missing variable into considerations of national power. Traditional strategic analysis typically focuses on quantifiable measures of military power, economic power, natural resources, and demographics.²¹ These forces can achieve influence through coercion and transaction. Adding the concept of soft power introduces the positive attraction, persuasion, and influence into the study of strategy. Just as economics has added a behavioral approach to recognize and incorporate complexity beyond the rational actor approach, adding soft power to our strategic lexicon captures a fuller range of relevant human interaction.²²

Nye's concept of power acknowledges that soft power is not a partial or complete substitute for hard power. Each form of power has the potential to generate hard and soft effects directly or indirectly. In this sense Nye recognizes that the problem of power is a complex multivariate equation, where the components of power interact, support, or counteract each other. His model of power demonstrates that when thinking about national power, you simply cannot lump three static measures of military, economic, and soft power together to measure comprehensive national power.

Second, as our military experiences over the last decade or more demonstrate, foreign perceptions and by extension, soft power, can have strategic effect. Nye wrote in 2004:

Since the global projection of American military force in the future will require access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing can have real effects on hard power. When support for America becomes a serious vote loser, even friendly leaders are less likely to accede to our requests.²³

More recently, the lack of popular support amongst the Iraqi populace was a key factor in preventing the continuing presence of U.S. forces in Iraq.²⁴ As a recent CSIS report found, "perceptions matter" and can affect the strategic decision-making of our allies, adversaries, and potential partners.²⁵

Third, the costs of achieving influence through hard power behavior have risen as individuals and non-state actors have acquired the tools to fight effectively with low-cost weaponry such as IEDs and propagate their narratives easily and rapidly around the globe. Soft power may work slower, but achieving influence through soft power costs less in terms of dollars and lives overall. Because positive influence is an act of acceptance by the receiver, it does not require full control to be established and

sustained through military force or other coercive means. Soft power also can lead to the cooperation of participation of partners to share the costs of any endeavor. In the words of Brantly Womack, “precisely because persuasion produces cooperation while husbanding resources, it can be sustained indefinitely.”²⁶

Perceptions can affect strategic outcomes. And perceptions can be affected by both co-optive (attractive) and command (coercive) means. A focus solely on hard power will likely fail to leverage the potential of co-optive power behaviors. By bringing soft power into our considerations we gain a more holistic understanding, one where hard and soft power interact with each other and can lead to synergistic effects. In an era of globalization, pervasive information, and growing complexity, gaining this more holistic understanding should be a priority for any strategist. Nye’s model of soft power offers us a model for this approach.

Part III: Assessment of China's Soft Power

Existing studies of China's soft power assess the issue using one or more approaches. The first approach is the identification and quantification of China's level of effort to project soft power. A second approach to assessing China's soft power examines the key resources which underpin soft power. A third approach utilizes polling, opinion research, and other indicators to examine perceptions, or the outcomes from the projection of China's power, both hard and soft.²⁷ This section will examine the findings of each of these approaches and attempt to combine them into a common assessment about the aggregate strength of China's soft power.

China's Soft Power Level of Effort

China's level of effort of soft power identifies whether soft power is of importance to China's leadership and what level of resources they have committed to promoting this aspect of power. China's level of effort applied to soft power can be assessed by examining China's internal discussions on soft power, reviewing their plans and programs, and observing the monetary, personnel, and other resources spent on projecting soft power. Level of effort is the starting point of a comprehensive consideration of Chinese soft power.

The projection of Chinese soft power made a major splash on the global scene and caught the attention of Western observers in the early years of the 21st century. China, from its ancient history to the first decades of the Communist party rule was primarily focused internally and rarely sought to project soft power.²⁸ As China began

its four modernizations in the 1980's, its global profile increased but was still dominated by signature events of negative impact like the quashing of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Chinese leadership purposely sought a low global profile.

As the 21st century began, however, China developed a new foreign policy narrative to reassure regional and global actors about its rapid economic growth and military modernization.²⁹ China's leadership and policy elite began to discuss, debate, and plan for soft power.³⁰ As Mingjiang Li notes, "observers of Chinese politics and international relations could hardly have failed to notice the upsurge of references to the term 'soft power' in China in recent years."³¹ While the specific application of soft power is still subject to debate within China, Shogo Suzuki explains that the leadership recognizes soft power as vital to fulfill "...its long-cherished dream of attaining equality with the great powers of the international community."³²

Western observers began to take note of China's soft power endeavors after the turn of the century. In 2004, Joseph Nye identified "signs of expansion of their soft-power resources."³³ Around the same time, Joshua Cooper Ramo posited an emerging "Beijing Consensus" or a Chinese model of global development that "offers hope for the world."³⁴ Ramo's concept, however, was his own, and not one that the Chinese themselves had developed or were actively promoting around the world.³⁵

In 2007, Joshua Kurlantzick's *Charm Offensive, How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World* described how he, as a journalist in Asia, witnessed the rise and transformation of Chinese soft power and its ability to transform China's image from international pariah to close friend.³⁶ Kurlantzick described China's growing soft power

“as the most potent weapon in Beijing’s foreign policy arsenal.”³⁷ In 2008, David Lampton assessed China’s level of effort by writing, “In education, cultural exchange, and communications infrastructure, its progress has been striking.”³⁸

In terms of monetary resources, China’s soft power projection was striking in the first decade of the century and it continues today. China rapidly expanded its Confucius Institute program to teach the Chinese language abroad, opening its first institute in 2004 and now at over 300 in seventy-eight countries.³⁹ In 2008, China launched a modern military hospital ship and employs it today for global humanitarian assistance missions.⁴⁰ Today China is building a “multi-floor TV studio complex” in Washington, DC, and offices in other key North American cities as part of its efforts to create a global news network with true international standing.⁴¹ While China’s efforts are expansive, it should be noted that they are largely imitative of American efforts during the Cold War, but without the reinforcing effects of U.S. commercial and non-governmental actors such as Hollywood and Facebook.

In summary, China seems to have both recognized the importance of soft power and maintained a level of effort in terms of money, people, and other resources that has gained attention around the world. China’s considerable expenditure to build its soft power tools began at a time when the U.S. essentially gutted many of its public diplomacy capabilities in the victorious aftermath of the Cold War.⁴² While China’s soft power efforts went from almost nothing to global reach in a decade, this activity and expenditure alone does not provide a complete picture of Chinese soft power. What remains to be considered is the strength of their key soft power resources and whether soft power has led to positive strategic outcomes for China.

China's Soft Power Resources

Joseph Nye identified the three main resources underpin soft power: culture, values, and foreign policy. After the initial splash of Chinese soft power onto the global scene, scholars began to assess China's resources. These assessments add a second layer of analysis to the consideration of Chinese soft power and an indication of the strength of its foundations.

Nye, in his 2002 book, *The Paradox of American Power*, discusses China's rise but barely mentions their capability for employing soft power.⁴³ He finds that China's "official communist ideology holds little appeal."⁴⁴ In his 2004 book, he describes them as a possible regional competitor, but not a true global challenger to the U.S. He again identifies that China's domestic policies, values, and stifling of intellectual freedom and resistance to foreign influences continue to inhibit the development of Chinese soft power.⁴⁵ In his most recent book, Nye makes the additional observation that China "has always had an attractive traditional culture."⁴⁶

China's culture has endured and prospered for centuries. As Henry Kissinger has observed, "no other country can claim so long a continuous civilization" and "Chinese language, culture, and political institutions were the hallmarks of civilization."⁴⁷ But China's culture has largely remained static, as it never interacted with any other civilization as large or as developed before the coming of the West.⁴⁸ Furthermore, China viewed its culture as exceptional, but not as universally applicable and consequently did not seek to actively export it.⁴⁹

Today, China is attempting to be more proactive with its traditional culture and utilize it for contemporary soft power attraction. China, however, has internal issues with the portrayal of its traditional culture. For example, two counties within China, Huimin and Guangrao, are competing for the label as the birthplace of the ancient strategist Sun Tzu in order to earn tourist dollars.⁵⁰

Another more significant conflict is between the interpretation of China's traditional culture and its current set of political values. While Confucius is the face of China for its overseas language institutes, his political meaning within China is less clear. Last year, a Confucius statue was placed across from Mao's portrait on the People's Square in Beijing and then rapidly removed as some viewed it as a challenge to Mao's legacy.⁵¹ Reconciling Mao's communist ideology with Confucianism remains an unsolved challenge within China.

The collision of traditional culture and political values is not the only source of tension within China's soft power resources. China's development of a more contemporary culture with popular appeal has also been stifled by China's political values and its fear of interaction with Western and other foreign cultures. As the noted Chinese author, Ha Jin, observed in 2003:

The government tries to promote cultural works, like painting, that do not directly involve ideology. Painting, music, food...but when we come to literature and film...the freedom is not there. (The Chinese government) really tries to control and manage it, and there is self-censorship as well. That is very clear. And (the Chinese government) does not want that control to be corroded by Western influences.⁵²

In 2006, two scholars, Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang similarly found that, "A true expansion of contemporary Chinese culture requires a politically relaxed environment

that encourages freedom of expression and a free exchange of ideas among Chinese and the world at large...”⁵³ Most recently, China’s leadership has acknowledged the threat of foreign cultural influence and has directed restrictions on the amount of foreign content in television broadcasts.⁵⁴

Issues such as these demonstrate that China’s underlying political values and culture are in tension, which weakens both aspects of these soft power resources. By comparison, America’s culture and political values are in much closer alignment. While U.S. traditional culture is really no more than three hundred years old, its political values have allowed an environment that has generated a contemporary culture with global attraction.

Beyond the tension between China’s political values and the projection of culture both old and new, China also has major issues with the appeal of its political values. As Suisheng Zhao writes, “the future growth of China’s soft power, however, is seriously restrained by the fact that pragmatic political values behind China’s rapid economic growth are attractive mostly to authoritarian elites.”⁵⁵ Some Chinese commentators have suggested as much; for example, the prominent Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong has suggested that “humane authority begins by creating a desirable model at home that inspires people abroad.”⁵⁶

China’s foreign policy has also been recently diminished as a soft power resource. Foreign policy should serve to balance the use of hard and soft power. Friendly diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and common values can be made irrelevant by aggressive shows of force or economic practices which benefit one side to the detriment

of the other. America experienced a marked decline in soft power in beginning of the twenty-first century as it undertook two wars which were perceived by global audiences as being unilateralist and less than legitimate.⁵⁷

In the period from 2003-2008, China's policy of non-interference looked attractive especially when compared to America's unilateralist interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. More recently, however, issues both near and far have cast China's foreign policy with more of a hard edge. China has aggressively pursued its territorial claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere. China has struggled with its response to the Arab Spring and the uprisings in Libya and Syria. During the Syrian uprising, still very much in progress at the time of this writing, China has appeared to return to the early Cold War days aligned with Russia against the rest of the United Nations Security Council and regional organizations such as the Arab League.

Overall, as David Lampton observes, China's soft or ideational power will be effective only as long as its military and economic power are reassuring (or at least non-threatening).⁵⁸ Yet, as Robert Sutter has recently noted, "Chinese officials and citizens remain deeply influenced by an officially encouraged erroneous claim that China has always been benign and never expansionist."⁵⁹ Sheng Ding and Yanzhong Huang identify the challenge for China that still exists today: "In advancing its peaceful rise agenda, however, Beijing often finds itself burdened by history and culture and distracted by the rising nationalist sentiments."⁶⁰

These recent missteps in Chinese foreign policy and the undermining of their soft power resources are not necessarily as damaging as their weakness in culture and

political values. Government can change foreign policy much faster than culture or political values. Global perceptions about the U.S. bounced back quickly after the change in foreign policies from the Bush to Obama administrations.

Beyond the consideration of the soft power resources individually, two other studies have attempted to assess and rank the soft power resources of individual countries, either globally or regionally. The second edition of *The New Persuaders* report by Jonathan McClory uses a unique methodology which blends quantitative and subjective measures to rank the soft power resources of thirty countries from around the globe. China ranks at the twentieth position, with a score less than half of that of the U.S which is ranked first overall.⁶¹ McClory notes China's strong cultural appeal, large investment in public diplomacy, and commitment to education, but also sees China's soft power as hindered by the lack of appeal to the global public of China's values and national narrative.⁶² It should be noted, however, that this sort of aggregated analysis does not take contextual factors into consideration; contextual factors could lead different audiences to perceive China's soft power resources in separate and unique ways.

At the regional level, a study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2008 examined the perceptions of soft power resources in Asia. Like the *New Persuaders* study, the Chicago Council's work used an expanded definition of soft power which includes economic influence and human capital. Their survey found that America's soft power resources are highly regarded in its selection of five Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The report also found that China's soft power resources ranked behind America's in all five countries.⁶³ A follow-up report in

2009 considered the effects of the global financial crisis and concluded that the crisis impacted but did not reverse its earlier findings.⁶⁴

China's Soft Power Outcomes

Directly measuring outcomes from soft power is a challenging task. Perceptions are shaped by multiple inputs. There is no single test which effectively segregates the effects of soft power and hard power. To get at the outcomes achieved by Chinese soft power, a series of indirect questions can help shape the outlines of an answer. Have perceptions of China's attractiveness changed over time? Is China's leadership globally persuasive? Ultimately, can China form strategically significant alliances and partnerships through persuasion and attraction?

In terms of China's global image, the results appear fairly stable. The Pew Center's Global Attitudes Project measures China's favorability, which can serve as a proxy measurement for China's attractiveness. As measured by the Pew Center's Global Attitudes Project, China's favorability among twenty-two polled countries, reflecting states of various size and locations appears relatively consistent since 2002.⁶⁵

Other indicators of attractiveness, however, paint a more mixed picture of China's soft power. Some scholars have used tourism as an indicator of soft power. Tourism, however, may reflect only curiosity and not actual attractiveness. Indicators which reflect more significant personal choices such as immigration and education are better proxy measurements. As a destination for global citizens who would like to migrate to another country, China does not even make it into the top fifteen countries.⁶⁶

The U.S., on the other hand, ranks number one by a wide margin over the other top fourteen countries.

In education, however, China's attractiveness appears to be increasing. The population of international students at the undergraduate and graduate level in China has consistently increased and was at just over seventy thousand in 2010.⁶⁷ China's foreign undergraduate and graduate population, however, is only about one-tenth of the number in the U.S. Consistent future growth of foreign study in China would be a positive reflection of China's attractiveness. Additionally, increased foreign education in China should yield increased soft power; assuming foreign students have a positive learning experience in China, they will return home having built lasting relationships in the host country.

Another long term measurement has been Gallup's polling on approval ratings for China's leadership. This poll can serve as an approximate measure for China's ability to persuade and set agendas. In terms of aggregated global ratings for approval of China's leadership, Gallup reports statistically similar median approval ratings for China from 2007 to 2009.⁶⁸ While this seems to indicate that China's expansive soft power efforts have been unproductive, they could also signify that China's soft power has succeeded globally in softening the perception of its rapid increase in military and economic power.

China, however, falls significantly behind the U.S. among the perceptions of countries in the Asia-Pacific region. At the aggregate level in the Asia-Pacific region, a recent Gallup poll finds that China's leadership only receives a 30% rating, significantly

below America's rating of 44%.⁶⁹ This is a major reverse from 2009 when China's leadership rating was six percentage points better than America's.⁷⁰ As discussed in the previous section, the United States made significant repairs to its policy and level of engagement in Asia, while China's more confrontational posture has damaged its soft power.

Beyond polling, another measurement of a country's influence both hard and soft is to consider its ability to use persuasion and agenda setting to gain and maintain strong strategic partners. The Pew Center's favorability data, when narrowed to the G20 countries, also provide indications of China's ability to persuade or attract the economically most powerful countries. Of the eighteen G20 countries that Pew polls, a majority in fifteen give the U.S. a favorable rating, vice only ten for China.⁷¹

Another way to approach the question is to look at the strategic alignments with China and the U.S. China's alignment with North Korea, Pakistan, Burma, and Iran places it significantly behind the U.S. with allies like Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines.⁷² Furthermore, India is increasingly becoming a strategic partner in alignment with the U.S. Overall, U.S. partners possess significantly more economic, military, and soft power when compared to China's key partners.

Conclusion on China's Soft Power

China has placed significant focus on soft power and approached this domain with a significant level of effort in terms of money, people, time, and other resources. This level of effort, however, has a weak foundation in terms of soft power resources—culture, values, and foreign policy.⁷³ China's internal tensions between its political

values and culture limit its external appeal. China lacks an ideology and set of values with universal or wide spread popular appeal. Additionally, China's sometimes assertive or aggressive approach to specific regional issues undermines its soft power. In the end, perceptions about China's favorability and attractiveness reflect these weaknesses especially within the Asia-Pacific region. And China's strategic alignments do not seem indicative of a country with a large reserve of soft power. Joshua Cooper Ramo's observation in 2007 makes for fitting conclusion about China's soft power at the global level: "Because there is little agreement about what China stands for at home and abroad, misunderstanding and suspicion are a growing feature of China's international life."⁷⁴

Part IV: Case Studies on China's Soft Power in the Asia-Pacific

As we move from the global aggregate level to the consideration of relational power between China and individual countries, soft and hard power become more intertwined. Additionally, the individual context in each country also shapes the application of soft power. This section will consider China's application of soft power in its relations with Australia, South Korea, Bangladesh, and Burma.⁷⁵ These cases present unique contexts in terms of history and existing relationships to the U.S. and China, the impact of hard power, and their differing locations within the sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific.

In addition to evaluating how China applies soft power, these case studies can also help with the conceptual understanding of soft power. Specifically, the studies serve to test three propositions: first, that the effective exercise of soft power is dependent on contextual factors; second, that the effective exercise of soft power is dependent on shared culture and values; and, third, that the effective exercise of soft power is dependent on hard power (either economic or military).

Australia

In 2005, China's soft power efforts in Australia were in full bloom. In that year, more people in Australia had positive feelings towards China than the U.S. by a margin of more than ten points.⁷⁶ In his 2007 book, Joshua Kurtlantz posited that "China might even drive a wedge between America and its closest allies."⁷⁷ Writing in 2009, one scholar found that "China's soft power diplomacy has been largely successful" and

suggested “China-Australia relations seem to have more potential to improve and expand.”⁷⁸ In 2010, a senior Australian scholar suggested in a paper that Australia pursue a policy of accommodation of China as a rising power.⁷⁹

Today’s polling results and Australia’s actions show that these previous trends have largely been reversed. The current perceptions of most Australians do not place the U.S. and China on equal status. Distrust of China now rates at 41% of the population, vice only 18% for the U.S. Australia has recently reconfirmed its strong alliance with the U.S. and agreed to the rotational presence of U.S. Marines on Australian soil.

In the case of Australia, a simple hard power analysis would seem to indicate that China and the U.S. should have equal influence. As a treaty partner, the U.S. enjoys a close military relationship with Australia and has been its long-term security guarantor. China, on the other hand, is Australia’s top economic partner. Australia’s exports to China, at over \$50 billion in 2010, are more than six times larger than its exports to the U.S.⁸⁰

Soft power appears to be the missing variable that explains the difference. In 2005, Australians distrust of the U.S. appears to have been correlated with perceptions of a unilateralist American foreign policy. Australians viewed U.S. foreign policy in 2005 as threatening as Islamic fundamentalism.⁸¹ Australia and the U.S., however, also possess a shared traditional culture and political values with the origins of both countries tracing back to England. By 2009, a change in U.S. presidents and adjustments to foreign policy led to a rebound in Australian perceptions of the U.S.

In 2005, China opened its first Confucius Institute in Australia and today has fielded twelve throughout the country. In 2008, Beijing hosted the Olympic Games, an event that should have had great attractive appeal. Positive images from the event, however, were not dominant in Australian minds. Instead, Australians were deeply disturbed by large pro-Beijing protests during the torch relay in Canberra prior to the games.⁸² These protests, allegedly organized by China's government, were an effort to disrupt the free speech of Tibetan activists and Chinese human rights protestors. Following the Olympics, China has attempted to suppress free speech of Uighur exiles visiting Australia and has arrested Australian mining executives in China.⁸³ China's attempts to gain economic influence throughout Oceania have also made Australia wary of China's objectives.⁸⁴

The case of Australia appears to indicate that when military and economic concerns are equally split between two different partners, soft power should be examined to determine the balance of influence. Shared values and culture appear to have provided the resilience to the U.S.-Australia relationship that allowed it to recover from a period of deep misgivings about U.S. foreign policy. China's soft power, on the other hand, was greatly diminished as China repeatedly attempted to suppress the right of free speech of some parties within Australia. In this case, China's actions demonstrated that its values were in direct conflict with those of Australia. Economic linkages between the two countries have not been enough to repair the rupture.

South Korea

South Korea is another U.S. ally where a Chinese soft power effort in the mid-2000's appeared successful. In 2008, Zhiquan Zhu suggested, "In only sixteen years after this normalization of relations, South Korea's economic and cultural relationship with China surpassed that with its long-term ally, the United States."⁸⁵ Writing in the same period, Joshua Kurlantzick recounts how some South Korean government officials felt constrained in their foreign policy agenda due to China's popularity amongst their public.⁸⁶

By 2011, however, the U.S. had outpolled China in surveys conducted in South Korea by Gallup for two consecutive years. The U.S. rating of 57% in 2011 was almost twice that of China's.⁸⁷ South Korean views captured within Pew's favorability ratings also demonstrate a steady downward trend of China's attractiveness since 2002.⁸⁸ Recently, the U.S. and South Korea have moved forward together on a mix of strategic issues to include the transformation of the U.S. military presence on the peninsula and a Korea-U.S. free trade agreement.

The level of military and economic influence in South Korea shows a split between China and the U.S. similar to the hard power dynamics in Australia. In terms of military security, the U.S. has been South Korea's long term ally and security guarantor. As with Australia, China is South Korea's largest trading partner. South Korea exported over \$120 billion to China in 2010.⁸⁹ This amount is close to three times more than Korean exports to the U.S. This general overview, however, masks some important contextual differences between the cases.

In this case the nature of the military and economic relationships is complicated by additional factors. With China, the key factors are geographic proximity to Korea, a mixed historical track record of peace and conflict, and some aspects of shared culture. With the U.S., South Korea does not share a common traditional cultural heritage as does Australia. South Korea, on the other hand, has evolved into a democracy with political values closer to the U.S. than China. South Korea also has permitted sizable U.S. military forces to be based on its territory. This presence has allowed the sharing of culture and values, as well as major tensions due to accidents or crimes caused by U.S. personnel.⁹⁰

As with Australia, the decline in positive perceptions of China within South Korea seem to run concurrent with China's attempt to suppress protests during the 2008 Olympic torch relay in Seoul. These perceptions have been deepened by China's muted reaction to North Korea's sinking of the South Korean ship *Cheonan*. Victor Cha quotes South Korean officials as saying "China has shown its true face" in the aftermath of the *Cheonan* sinking.⁹¹ Most recently, official or unofficial Chinese activities and actions in the waters around the Korean peninsula have further demonstrated the aggressive posture of China towards South Korea.⁹²

An additional soft power dynamic visible between the two nations is that while China attempts to generate soft power influence on South Korea, it is South Korea that is generating significant soft power both regionally and globally through its popular contemporary culture. The Korean Wave (also known as *Hallyu*) of soap operas and pop music has been extremely popular throughout the region from parts of India to Vietnam and Cambodia.⁹³ South Korean cultural exports have been growing at 25% a

year since 2007 and totaled over \$4 billion in 2011.⁹⁴ South Korea's political freedoms and status as one of the most wired countries in the world have unleashed the creativity necessary to generate a globally popular contemporary culture. Emerging evidence also suggests that as regional nations are attracted to South Korea's contemporary culture, they may also be interested in South Korea as an appropriate model for political and economic development.⁹⁵

In short, the rosy proclamations of significant Chinese soft power influence over South Korea in the mid 2000's now appear overcome by events. A significant economic relationship and some soft power initiatives have not been enough to gloss over China's continuing support for a hostile North Korea and China's own aggressiveness along its boundaries. Victor Cha finds that "dissimilar political values are a critical driver of future China-ROK relations."⁹⁶ Combined with the fact that South Korea is generating soft power through its pop culture at a level which exceeds China, China's soft power does not appear very significant on the southern half of the Korean peninsula.

Bangladesh

Bangladeshi perceptions of China appear relatively stable overall. A 2011 poll found about 84% of Bangladeshi holding favorable views of China; the result for the U.S. was similar at 79%.⁹⁷ Previously in 2007, Pew's favorability polling in Bangladesh reflected a 74% result for China vice 53% for the U.S.⁹⁸ Over this period of years, China appears to be a relatively attractive country to the majority of Bangladeshis. Results for

the U.S. appear to have rebounded from the lows typically experienced in Muslim nations during the Iraq War.

On the narrower question of approval of China's leadership, Bangladeshi feelings are not as strong. Gallup's polling shows Bangladeshi perceptions of China's leadership at 30% favorable and 32% unfavorable, a statistical tie. The comparative rating for the U.S. was 40% approval and 32% disapproval. India's ratings are almost the same as those of the U.S. These results are more indicative towards Bangladeshi perceptions of China's foreign policy relative to that of the U.S. and India.

The Bangladesh case has significantly different contextual factors. Bangladesh has not been a long time U.S. treaty partner like Australia and South Korea. Bangladesh neither shares a common culture with the U.S., nor had the long term stationing of U.S. military forces on its territory. And Bangladesh's relationship with China is not complicated by historical perceptions or third party issues like North Korea. Despite the violent split from Pakistan that created Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan's close relations with China do not color China's current relationship with Bangladesh. And despite Bangladesh's position between India and China, it is not caught up in competition between the two larger nations.

China has made extensive soft power efforts in Bangladesh. Reciprocal culture and sports exchanges have been in place since 1979.⁹⁹ China's efforts to project culture are viewed as more benign and positive when compared to the U.S. A greater percentage of Bangladeshis believe that the U.S. attempts to impose culture on them (66%) vice China (45%).¹⁰⁰

Both the U.S. and China provide military training and sell arms to Bangladesh.¹⁰¹ The U.S. military and civilian role, however, in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to Bangladesh has been much more prominent. Overall, polling reflects larger Bangladeshi majorities crediting the U.S. for its aid and disaster relief than China.¹⁰² Operation SEA ANGEL, the massive U.S. relief effort following a major cyclone in 1991, was commemorated by both nations on its twentieth anniversary last year.¹⁰³ China has attempted to increase its soft military profile; its hospital ship, the *PEACE ARK*, visited Bangladesh as one of the stops on its first foreign mission in 2010.¹⁰⁴

The greatest imbalance between China and the U.S. appears to be in the economic realm. Both nations have key economic relationships with Bangladesh, including aid, loans, and other forms of assistance. As trading partners, however, the benefits to Bangladesh from trade with the U.S. and China are dissimilar. Bangladesh gains more from the U.S., as the U.S. is the top importer of Bangladeshi goods. China, on the other hand, is the top exporter to Bangladesh; its exports were over \$6 billion greater than its imports from Bangladesh.¹⁰⁵

Overall, the case of Bangladesh seems to be a qualified success story for China. Bangladesh continues to hold favorable impressions of China despite its rising power. The majority of the Bangladesh populace does not believe that China is forcing its culture on them. Bangladeshis, however, also do not credit China with the same level of aid and disaster relief as the U.S. Whether China will continue to be perceived in a positive light may depend on whether the benefits of trade continue to be perceived as

positive in Bangladesh. Economic interaction does not seem to always guarantee a level of soft power influence.

Burma (Myanmar)

Assessing Burmese perceptions of China is a hard task. Pew, Gallup or other polling organizations have not been available given the authoritarian nature of all but the most recent Burmese governments. The research of Min Zin, a graduate student at University of California-Berkeley provides an alternate source of evidence in this case.

A cursory glance at the hard power dynamics between China and Burma would seem to indicate that China should wield enormous influence over the country. Years of U.S. and Western sanctions have circumscribed Burma's options for foreign support. As a result, China's military and economic interaction with Burma is uniquely strong. The combination of Western sanctions and Chinese support internationally for Burma's regime have combined to provide China nearly uncontested access to Burma's government, markets, and resources.

Yet, as Min Zin's research demonstrates, "there is an observable negative attitude among the people of Burma against the Chinese."¹⁰⁶ His review of contemporary Burmese cultural and media works from 1988 onwards identify a recurrent theme of concern and outrage over Chinese migration, economic domination, and cultural assimilation.¹⁰⁷ Even more notable is that this theme has been evident in publically available works which suggests at least tacit approval by the military government given its system of censorship.

Cultural and historical context explains much of the enmity. Burma shares a common border with China and has a long track record of historical interaction with China. Since independence, Burma has faced multiple challenges to its unity and sovereignty, some of which have either originated from or been supported by China. Many in the Burmese military have had their formative professional experiences fighting the Communist Party of Burma which was supported by Beijing.¹⁰⁸ Burma was previously the scene of anti-Chinese riots in 1967.¹⁰⁹

For a country supposedly under significant Chinese influence, the Burmese regime has recently acted with a remarkable streak of independence. During the Kokang incident in 2009, the Burmese moved against a small ethnic Chinese enclave along the border without notifying Beijing and drove up to 20,000 refugees north into China.¹¹⁰ More recently, the negative perceptions towards China of the regime, the elite, and the populace were unified last year in the suspension of China's Myitsone dam project on the Irrawaddy River.¹¹¹ Burma has also recently undertaken political reforms on a possible path to democracy. Some have even speculated that these reforms are an effort to gain Western support in order to balance the large and increasing Chinese influence in Burma.¹¹²

China's failure to fully apply soft power to reach the populace also seems to have heavily contributed to unfavorable perceptions in Burmese minds. China's diplomatic assistance has only served to prop up an authoritarian military regime. China's assistance to Burma has largely been in the form of military arms sales and investment on terms favorable to China. Economic interaction has utilized Chinese labor and has done little to build Burmese technical knowledge. Furthermore, the preponderance of

this assistance appears to have been directed through the regime and the elite. Only recently has China directed outreach towards the people, having opened a Confucius center in Mandalay.¹¹³

Part V: Conclusions

When considered either as a global actor or as the larger side in a two-party relationship, China's soft power does not appear strong in its ability to attract and persuade for strategic outcomes in Asia. Even though China has increased its level of effort to project soft power from nothing to levels reminiscent of the U.S. during the Cold War, the underpinnings of its soft power have prominent weaknesses. As a global actor, China's soft power efforts may have moderated the appearance of its rise, but they have not found the right balance between culture, political values, and foreign policy to gather an alignment of powerful nations to its side. As Suisheng Zhao has observed, "In spite of its initial success, China's current approach to soft power lacks a contemporary moral appeal and therefore is hardly sustainable in the competition with the United States to inspire the vision of building a free and prosperous world."¹¹⁴

Within the Asia-Pacific region, the case studies seem to indicate that China's application of soft power is similarly challenged. The alarmist observations in the mid-2000's of China's possible dominance based on soft power have been demonstrated as premature. Instead of Chinese dominance, China's soft influence has become tangled up with hard power approaches and actions: interference in the rights of free speech in other nations, provocations by long-time allies against newer friends, territorial disputes, and imbalanced economic outcomes. Only in Bangladesh does Chinese soft power appear to have been effective. And given the imbalance in trade between Bangladesh and China, one wonders how much longer it will remain so.

What might improve China's soft power? China could "pivot" to a more moral footing to enhance its soft power. Changing culture and political values takes time, but a softer approach to foreign policy could occur faster. One Chinese scholar has recently suggested that, "If the Chinese government is clever, it would do well to think about the reason why the U.S. is suddenly so popular in the region."¹¹⁵ But these opinions are counterbalanced by more heavy-handed nationalist attitudes that suggest China should be more aggressive towards its neighbors. On the other end of the debate, the official Chinese news agency recently published an article which recommends that "sometimes, certain altercations (with the neighbors) are appropriate and can foster the return of peace."¹¹⁶

China might also strive to paint the U.S. pivot towards Asia as bellicose and hostile in order to make the U.S. seem like the aggressor. China already attempts to paint the reactions of the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in the South China Sea as orchestrated or provoked by the U.S. The reality, however, is that China's occasional belligerence in its surrounding maritime territory causes Asia-Pacific countries to seek greater a U.S. presence. Only a significant misstep by the U.S. would cause it to appear as the aggressor in the region.

It is important to note that finding China to be weak in soft power does not mean that China lacks the ability to influence the region. China has significant and growing resources on the hard end of the power spectrum. Regional countries recognize China's historical and geographic prominence. The need for loans, investment, and market opportunities, as well as fears of growing and regionally unmatched Chinese

military power could drive the smaller countries of the region to bandwagon with China if they do not perceive a better alternative.

As long as the U.S. maintains a comprehensive presence in the region with military, economic, and soft power, China's coercive options will be constrained. Absent U.S. presence, China might find the use of soft power unnecessary. A U.S. pullback would leave the middle and smaller powers of the region on their own up against the geographic centrality, economic mass, and rising military power of the Middle Kingdom. Ultimately, they would have little choice but to acquiesce to Chinese hegemony. Continued U.S. presence, however, reassures smaller countries, allows them to seek balanced outcomes with China, and constrains China's ability to directly or indirectly coerce them into submission. Through these effects, U.S. presence serves as a forcing function to place China on a path based on soft power.

For the U.S., a real transformation in China which generates greater soft power should be applauded. If China were to increase its foundational resources of soft power, the movement would probably reflect greater internal freedoms, a greater openness to the world, and a more nuanced approach which benefits the region and others and not just China. Real Chinese soft power would incorporate a primarily diplomatic approach to resolving territorial and resource disputes in the region, and not one based on diplomatic, economic or military coercion. A transformation towards greater Chinese soft power, however, requires an internal leadership decision to choose a globally appealing strategic narrative instead of one that is only optimized to appeal to the nationalism of its internal audience. And the path to achieving real soft power will take years if not decades.

Given a world where hard and soft power create effects and affect each other, what are the lessons for the U.S. as it exercises power to achieve influence around the globe? From the case studies, it is clear that context is important in power relationships. U.S. culture may be loved by some countries and viewed as imposing by others. Distance from China may reduce one country's threat perceptions while proximity and history may make others nations much more wary. To be effective, strategy should be adapted to each specific audience and its unique context. Furthermore, a strategist should also consider the perceptual effects of proposed actions on audiences other than the target of the intended action. Outside audiences may not see U.S. intent as clearly as we do ourselves. As Nye observes, context matters.

Additionally, while military power and economic interaction may achieve an immediate level of influence over a partner country, lasting influence appears to be contingent on the slow process of building additional influence on the soft side of the spectrum. The relationships built through soft power lead to trust, cooperation, and a shared narrative when approaching the varied problems of a complex world. Higher levels of soft power also seem to provide resilience in a relationship, even during disagreements and other periods of tension. In an era where information technology has increased the participation of the people as well as non-state actors, and where non-traditional security challenges require cooperation and collaboration, effective strategy should seek to build and reinforce soft power and not only the economic and military aspects of hard power. Maximizing a nation's power is about finding the optimal

combination that maximizes the combined sum of all three types of power. In the exercise of strategy, soft power matters.

Endnotes

¹ For the purpose of this project, Asia-Pacific region is defined as the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility which extends as far west as India and as far north as China and Mongolia.

² Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 8.

³ Ibid, 6-7.

⁴ Ibid., 6.

⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Lanham, Md.: Oxford University Press, USA, 2003), 9.

⁷ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 21.

⁸ Nye derived this concept of soft power from others who discovered there are two additional aspects to relational power other than ability to simply “command” change thru military or economic power. For a discussion of the three faces of power, see Ibid., 10-18.

⁹ Ibid., 84.

¹⁰ Ibid., 20.

¹¹ As an example, see Jehangir Pocha, “The Rising “Soft Power” of India and China,” *New Perspectives Quarterly* 20, no.1 (Winter 2003): 5-13.

¹² A 2008 report is a prime example of equating most or all economic interaction with soft power; see Thomas Lum, *Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investement in the Developing World* (Washington, DC: U.S Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2008), 1-2. A more recent example is JoAnne Wagner, “Going Out: Is China's Skillful Use of Soft Power in Sub-Saharan Africa a Threat to U.S. Interests?” *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 64, 1st Quarter 2012, 99-106.

¹³ Stephen S. Cohen and J.Bradford Delong, *The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have The Money* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 60.

¹⁴ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 105-6. Nye identifies that soft power comes not from a single tool, but from a whole range of governmental and non-governmental activities including daily communications, strategic communications, and engagements which build lasting relationship with key individuals.

¹⁵ David M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 118.

¹⁶ Christopher Layne, "The unbearable lightness of soft power," in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (London: Routledge, 2010), 51-82.

¹⁷ Nye makes this point in his response to Layne's critiques in Joseph S. Nye, "Responding to my critics and concluding thoughts," in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, ed. Parmar and Cox, 219.

¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 8. While not speaking directly to soft power, Dr. Henry Kissinger argues that "thoughtful realists understand that values are an important component of reality." Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 413.

¹⁹ Colin S. Gray, *Hard Power and Soft Power: the Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), vi.

²⁰ See discussion in Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 7-8.

²¹ Eric S. Edelman, *Understanding America's Contested Primacy* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), 31-35.

²² See Paul Krugman, "How Did Economists Get It So Wrong," *New York Times* Online, September 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?_r=1&ref=paulkrugman (accessed online Mar 28, 2009).

²³ Nye, *Soft Power*, 27.

²⁴ Liz Sly. "Slain Civilians taint U.S. Legacy in Iraq," *Washington Post*, December 11, 2011.

²⁵ Greg Cohen, ed., *Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), xii.

²⁶ Brantly Womack, *China Among Unequals: Asymmetric Foreign Relationships in Asia* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2010), 72.

²⁷ Opinion polls are not a perfect tool, but when examined over time can yield valuable insights. See Nye's comments in *Soft Power*, 18.

²⁸ Kissinger, *On China*, 17, 357.

²⁹ For an overview of China's foreign policy narratives, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2011 Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 327-328. See also Kissinger, *On China*, 499.

³⁰ For an overview, see Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate," Carola McGiffert, ed., *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 10-26.

³¹ Mingjiang Li, ed. *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 21.

³² Shogo Suzuki, "The myth and reality of China's soft power," in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, ed. Parmar and Cox, 201.

³³ Nye, *Soft Power*, 88-89.

³⁴ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2004), 60.

³⁵ Suzuki, "The myth and reality of China's soft power," 209; See also Sheena Chestnut and Alastair Iain Johnson, "Is China Rising," in Eva Paus and Penelope B. Prime, ed. *Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 251.

³⁶ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive, How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 4-5.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁸ Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power*, 163.

³⁹ Li, *Soft Power*, 70. See also, Glaser and Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics," 16; and Author Not Provided, "China Abroad: Sun Tzu and the art of soft power" *The Economist*, Dec 17, 2011, iPad edition.

⁴⁰ Peter Mackenzie, *Red Crosses, Blue Water: Hospital Ships and China's Expanding Naval Presence* (Washington, DC: CNA, September 2011), 11.

⁴¹ Paul Farhi, "In D.C., China builds a news hub to help polish its global image," *Washington Post* Online, January 16, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/china-building-news-hub-in-dc/2012/01/12/gIQAh2Ps3P_story.html (accessed March 28, 2012).

⁴² Nye, *Soft Power*, 104-105.

⁴³ Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 18-22.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁴⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*, 89.

⁴⁶ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 178.

- ⁴⁷ Kissinger, *On China*, 3.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 9, 16-17.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 17.
- ⁵⁰ Author Not Provided, "China Abroad: Sun Tzu and the art of soft power" *The Economist*, Dec 17, 2011, iPad edition.
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² Ha Jin, "Individualism Arrives In China," interview, *New Perspectives Quarterly* 20, no.1 (Winter 2003), 18.
- ⁵³ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Source and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power,'" *Survival* 48, no.2 (Summer 2006): 27.
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- ⁵⁵ Suisheng Zhao, "The Prospect of China's Soft Power: How sustainable?" in Li, ed. *Soft Power*, 247.
- ⁵⁶ Yan Xuetong, "How China Can Defeat America," *New York Times*, Nov. 21, 2011, p. 29.
- ⁵⁷ Cohen, ed., *Capacity and Resolve*, xiv; Lum, *Comparing Global Influence*, 5.
- ⁵⁸ Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power*, 163.
- ⁵⁹ Robert Sutter, "U.S.-Chinese Competition in Asia: Legacies Help America," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* No. 147 (Honolulu: East West Center, Feb 1, 2012).
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- ⁶¹ Jonathan McClory, *The New Persuaders II: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power* (London: Institute for Government) 15.
- ⁶² Ibid., 23.
- ⁶³ Christopher B. Whitney, dir., *Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion* (Chicago, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, April 2009), 2-3.
- ⁶⁴ Thomas J. Wright, *Implications of the Financial Crisis for Soft Power in East Asia* (Chicago, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, November 2009).

⁶⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower* (Washington DC, Pew Research Center, July 13, 2011), 36-38.

⁶⁶ Neli Espiova, Julie Ray, and Rajesh Srinivasan, *Young, Less Educated Yearn to Migrate to the U.S.* (Washington DC, Gallup: April 30, 2010), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/127604/Young-Less-Educated-Yearn-Migrate.aspx> (accessed Mar 28, 2012).

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⁶⁸ Ian T. Brown and Tao Wu, *China and the U.S.: Competing for Political Influence* (Washington DC, Gallup: May 22, 2009), <http://www.gallup.com/poll/118591/China-Competing-Political-Influence.aspx> (accessed Mar 28, 2012).

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⁷¹ Data from the Pew Global Attitudes online key indicators database at <http://www.pewglobal.org/wp-content/themes/pew-global/indicators-database>, updated with data from 2011 spring survey (accessed Feb, 3, 2012). Note that polling data for some countries is prior to 2011 (all countries are not polled annually; most recent data used).

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⁷⁴ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *Brand China* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2007), 13.

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⁷⁷ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive*, 214.

⁷⁸ Zhiqun Zhu, "China's Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia," in Li, ed. *Soft Power*, 200-201.

⁷⁹ Hugh White, "Power Shift: rethinking Australia's place in the Asian Century," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 1 (February 2011): 81-93.

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⁸⁵ Zhu, "China's Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia," 187.

⁸⁶ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive*, 132.

⁸⁷ Cynkar, *U.S. Leadership Approval Ratings*.

⁸⁸ Data from the Pew Global Attitudes online key indicators database at <http://www.pewglobal.org/wp-content/themes/pew-global/indicators-database>; data for "Opinion of China" in South Korea. Pew's data has gaps from 2003 to 2006, but the trend line is clearly evident.

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⁹¹ Victor D. Cha, "Fundamental Realism: Korean Assessments of U.S. Power," in Cohen, ed., *Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of U.S. Power*, 41.

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¹⁰⁰ ORB International, "Phase 4."

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¹⁰⁵ Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2011*.

¹⁰⁶ Min Zin, "Burmese Attitude toward Chinese: Portrayal of the Chinese in Contemporary Cultural and Media Works," unpublished paper presented at Georgetown University, November 4, 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Min Zin's research is echoed in Thant Myint-U, *Where China Meets India*, p.43. This author also personally heard similar impressions from residents of Mandalay in 1995.

¹⁰⁸ Min Zin, "Burmese Attitude," 5; Thant Myint-U, *Where China Meets India*, 70.

¹⁰⁹ Thant Myint-U, *Where China Meets India*, 51. Min Zin refers to the riots in 1969.

¹¹⁰ Thant Myint-U, *Where China Meets India*, 217-218.

¹¹¹ Min Zin, "Burmese Attitude," 9-10.

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¹¹³ Thant Myint-U, *Where China Meets India*, 53.

¹¹⁴ Suisheng Zhao, "The Prospect of China's Soft Power," 247.

¹¹⁵ Shi Yinhong, director of the Center on American Studies at the Renmin University in Beijing, as quoted in Ian Johnson and Jackie Calmes, "News Analysis: As U.S. Looks to Asia, It Sees China Everywhere," *New York Times*, November 16, 2011.

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